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Abstract 
 
In this paper I propose a medium scale Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
model for emphasizing the effects of the new Basel III Agreement for Romania‟s financial 
stability. This model has similar structures as those developed by Walque et al. (2010) and 
Roger and Vlček (2011) but, combining their features, it results a more comprehensive 
framework.  
First of all, I calibrated this model in order to obtain the deep parameters. After 
calibration, I used several shocks to conduct simulations for analyze if the model can capture 
the behavior of the economy. In the end of this study, I estimate the model using Bayesian 
techniques to match the data of the Romania‟s economy.   
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper reflects the impact that the new requirements of capital and liquidity will 
have on Romania‟s economy and financial system in particular once that Basel III 
Agreement will be implemented. The Basel III Agreement represents first of all an 
alternative for reaching a high degree of financial stability that can face the challenges of 
future economic and financial crises.  This last Agreement completes the Basel II and Basel 
2.5 frameworks, keeping the features that proved useful and proposing new features that will 
enlarge the cover area of the prudential supervision.  
 In November 2011, G20 leaders in Cannes called on jurisdictions to meet their 
commitment to implement fully and consistently Basel II and Basel 2.5 by end 2011, and 
Basel III, starting in 2013 and completing by 1 January 2019. In December 2010, Basel III 
was released and Committee members agreed to implement Basel III from 1 January 2013, 
subject to transitional and phase-in arrangements.1 The actual crisis represents a research lab 
for Basel Committee and the two working papers - “Strengthening the Resilience of the 
Banking Sector” (henceforth referred to as „Basel III') and “International Framework for 
Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” – represent the conclusions of the 
researchers, respective, the proposals for a higher degree of financial stability. The 
particularity of this last framework is that its implementation as an imposed requirement will 
be made in 2018/2019. Until then, starting from 2013, the proposed measures will act as 
recommendations and the indicators will be calculated only as informative measure for 
monitoring purposes. This strategy of implementation will support the banks, allowing them 
to gradually adapt to the new requirement, minimizing implementation costs. Instead, for 
researchers, this flexible implementation strategy makes more difficult to choose the 
common adaptation mechanism representative for whole financial system. 
In Romania, financial stability is one of the several objectives of the central bank, the 
National Bank of Romania (NBR). In the 2011‟s Financial Stability Report, NBR reference 
                                                                 
1
 BCBS (2012), p. 8. 
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at the impact produced by implementing Basel III agreement but concentrates only on a 
higher capital requirement. The conclusion of the report is that Romania‟s financial sector 
can easily adapt to these requirements because the banks‟ capitalization remains at a 
comfortable level of 14.2% (June, 2011).  As a member of the European Union, Romania 
will implement the Basel III Agreement through Capital Requirement Directive (CRD IV).  
Therefore, in terms of progress in implementing the agreement, Romania fits with other 
European countries in the second stage according to the BIS report2:  draft regulation 
published.3 
In this study, the impact that transition from Basel II to Basel III will have on the 
financial environment is highlighted by a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model 
(DSGE) with the banking sector. This model highlights the links between financial sector and 
real economy variables, especially the channels through which decisions that ensure financial 
stability in the real economy spreads. Also, another reason for considering appropriate this 
model is the fact that financial sector has a sufficiently complex representation and can 
capture most of the requirements recommended by the Agreement. 
The paper is organized as follows. In chapter II it describes the framework of Basel 
III going to review the new features, how to implement them and the costs and benefits of the 
new provisions. Chapter III will make a brief review of the literature dealing with this topic, 
referring in particular to groups of researchers from BIS: Macroeconomic Assessment Group 
(MAG) - which highlighted the financial costs of adopting new standards, and Long 
Economic Impact-term group (LEI), part of the Basel Committee for Banking Stability 
(BCBS) - whose efforts have been conducted to reflect the benefits of implementing new 
long-term requirements. Chapter IV contains a description of the model used for analysis. 
Chapter V is dedicated to the calibration of the model. Chapter VI contains a description of 
the simulations used to emphasize how model reacts when shocks occur. Chapter VII of this 
paper is concentrated on the estimation techniques used for obtaining the parameters that 
match the observed data and on the results of the estimation procedure. In Chapter VIII the 
last chapter of the book, I present the research findings and possible ways in which research 
                                                                 
2
 Idem, p. 7 
3
 Third compromise text (directive and regulation) published by the Danish Presidency on 28 March 2012 
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can be improved further. In Chapter VI, the last chapter of the book, I present the conclusions 
of this research I will mention several possible ways in which research can be further 
improved. 
II. Basel III – Description 
 
 As I mentioned before, the Basel III Agreement consists of two framework 
documents. Each of these documents is referring to one of the main directions of activity of 
this Agreement: strengthening bank capital and providing liquidity in the financial system. 
2.1. Capital requirements 
 
 The motivation that led to the increase in capital requirement was that the global 
banking system entered the crisis with an insufficient level of high quality capital. The crisis 
also revealed the inconsistency in the definition of capital across jurisdictions and the lack of 
disclosure that would have enabled the market to fully assess and compare the quality of 
capital across jurisdictions. A key element of the new definition of capital is the greater focus 
on common equity, the highest quality component of a bank‟s capital. 
 Following Basel III methodology, total regulatory capital will consist of the sum of 
the following elements4: 
1. Tier 1 Capital (going-concern capital) 
a) Common Equity Tier 1: 
- Common shares issued by the bank that meet the criteria for classification as 
common shares for regulatory purposes (or the equivalent for non-joint stock 
companies); 
- Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments included 
Common Equity Tier 1; 
- Retained earnings; 
- Accumulated other comprehensive income and other disclosed reserves; 
                                                                 
4
 BCBS (2011A) pp. 12-19. 
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- Common shares issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third 
parties (i.e. minority interest) that meet the criteria for inclusion in Common 
Equity Tier 1 capital; 
- Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Common Equity Tier 1; 
b) Additional Tier 1 
- Instruments issued by the bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in Additional 
Tier 1 capital (and are not included in Common Equity Tier 1); 
- Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments included in 
Additional Tier 1 capital; 
- Instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third 
parties that meet the criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital and are not 
included in Common Equity Tier 1; 
- Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Additional Tier 1 Capital. 
2. Tier 2 Capital (gone-concern capital) 
- Instruments issued by the bank that meet the criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 capital 
(and are not included in Tier 1 capital); 
- Stock surplus (share premium) resulting from the issue of instruments included in 
Tier 2 capital; 
- Instruments issued by consolidated subsidiaries of the bank and held by third 
parties that meet the criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 capital and are not included in 
Tier 1 capital; 
- Certain loan loss provisions; 
- Regulatory adjustments applied in the calculation of Tier 2 Capital. 
This definition of bank capital first has the role to establish a basis for calculating 
new indicators of solvency but also acts to separate the elements of capital depending on 
their solvency quality5. 
                                                                 
5
 For an ample description of the conditions of classification of capital see BCBS (2011A), section dedicated to 
new definition of capital. 
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Basel Committee's proposals regarding the establishment of new capital adequacy 
indicators (Form of Capital / Risk Weighted Assets) and how the actions will be 
implemented during the transition to Pillar I are summarized in the following table:  
Table 1: Capital requirements under Basel III 
Ratio/RWA Basel II Transitional arrangements Basel III 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Common 
Equity Tier 1 
(CET1) 
2.00% 3.50% 4.00% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 
Capital 
Conservation 
Buffer (CCB) 
    0,625% 1,250
% 
1.875% 2.50% 
Common 
Equity Tier 1 
+ CCB 
 3.50% 4.00% 4.50% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7.00% 
Regulatory 
Adjustments 
  20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100% 
Tier 1 
Capital 
4.00% 4.50% 5.50% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 
Total capital 8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 
Total capital 
+ CCB 
 8.00% 8.00% 8.00% 8.625% 9.25% 9.875% 10.50% 
 
At these indicators can be added also the countercyclical buffer, an indicator that 
ranges from 0% to 2.50% depending on the geographic profile where bank conducts its 
business.  
The capital adequacy measures are applied to all internationally active banks to 
ensure that each bank maintains an appropriate level of capital relative to its own exposures. 
A number of the policy measures will have a particular impact on global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs), given their business models have generally placed greater 
emphasis on trading and capital markets related activities, which are most affected by the 
enhanced risk coverage of the capital framework. The measures are included in a rules text 
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published by Basel Committee in November 20116. The Committee realizes that these policy 
measures are significant but are not sufficient to address the negative externalities posed by 
G-SIBs nor are they adequate to protect the system from the wider spillover risks of G-SIBs. 
In addition to meeting the Basel III requirements, global systemically important 
financial institutions must have higher loss absorbency capacity to reflect the greater risks 
that they pose to the financial system. The additional loss absorbency requirements are to be 
met with a progressive Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement ranging from 1% 
to 2.5%, depending on a bank‟s systemic importance. For banks facing the highest G-SIB 
surcharge, an additional loss absorbency of 1% could be applied as a disincentive to increase 
materially their global systemic importance in the future. 
 The Basel III Pillar I, along with another two key reforms will complete the Basel III 
Capital Framework. Those are Pillar 2 – Risk management and Supervision and Pillar 2 – 
Market discipline. 
2.2. Liquidity requirements 
 
 Basel III framework, unlike his predecessors, suggests a new direction for a healthier 
financial environment that is minimizing liquidity risk. Even though in terms of solvency 
banks show a healthy image, recent events have shown us that a strategy allocation of assets 
and liabilities oriented on satisfactory yields but with low degree of liquidity can generate 
disastrous imbalances when on markets is establishing panic. 
For liquidity risk supervision, the Committee has developed two standards that have 
separate but complementary objectives. The first standard is Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR)7 and has the objective to promote the short-term resilience of the liquidity risk profile 
of banks by ensuring that they have sufficient high-quality liquid assets to survive a 
significant stress scenario lasting 30 calendar days. The second standard is the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (NFSR)8 that has a time horizon of one year and has been developed to 
                                                                 
6
 BCBS (2011B) p.3. 
7
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capture structural issues to provide a sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities. 
The objective of the Net Stable Funding Ratio standard is to promote resilience over a longer 
time horizon by creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with more 
stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis.9 
Both the LCR and the NSFR will be subject to an observation. After an observation 
period beginning in 2011, the LCR, including any revisions, will be introduced on 1 January 
2015 and the NSFR, as well including any revisions, will move to a minimum standard by 1 
January 2018.   
The new capital and liquidity requirements represent the alternative that the 
Commission proposes to meet future challenges that the global financial system will be 
subjected. Implementation of Basel III gave rise to clashes of ideas that put in balance the 
costs and benefits for financial systems still affected of the slow return from the recent 
economic crisis.  
III. Literature review  
  
 This paper embodies a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with an 
endogenous and heterogeneous banking sector that that allows bank regulations following de 
Walque et al. (2010) and Roger and Vlček (2011). The principal advantage of DSGE 
modeling for this particular research field is that it can provide a coherent framework for 
policy discussion and analysis by capturing the dynamic relationships among different 
macroeconomic variables while being grounded in microeconomic theory. Nevertheless, 
DSGE models have limitations. Prime among these is that they may be too stylized to fully 
capture the dynamics of the data. Moreover, fitting DSGE models to observable data is still 
quite challenging, even when using sophisticated econometric and statistical methods.10 
 First of all, this model starts from a real business cycle (RBC) model with a shock in 
total-factor productivity (TFP) but it leaves soon the Kydland and Prescott (1982) setting by 
                                                                 
9
 BCBS (2010), p. 25. 
10
 MAG (2010) p. 26-27 
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introducing a banking sector. In this type of setting, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
theorem doesn‟t holds anymore meaning that financial and credit market conditions aren‟t 
irrelevant and can affect the real economy.  
This model is part of a larger group of models that assess the relevance of a detailed 
banking sector for monetary policy and supervision as in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), 
Christiano et al. (2009) and Gerali et al. (2009). The papers mentioned before use 
homogenous banks and the interbank market either collapses or amounts to a connection with 
the central bank. De Walque et al. (2010) argues that this setting where the absence of a true 
interbank market and the lack of heterogeneity obscures the relationships between banks 
cannot be used to emphasize how a financial system will react at changes in regulatory 
measurements proposed by a supervisory authority or by central bank.  
The main cores of researchers studying the issue of financial stability in the spirit of 
Basel III are the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG) under the patronage of Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and Long-term Economic Impact Group (LEI) as part of the 
Basel Committee Banking stability (BCBS). For work of the MAG, the study of Roger and 
Vlček (2011) made an important contribution by introducing in a DSGE model both the new 
features imposed by Basel III: changes in capital and liquidity requirements. In most DSGE 
models, the notion of liquidity is not well established. However, Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) 
have started incorporating this notion of liquidity into New Keynesian DSGE models11.  
The Macroeconomic Assessment Group uses a broad range of models developed for 
policy analysis in central banks and international organizations (semi-structural large-scale 
models, reduced-form VAR-type models, DSGE models).  The use of the DSGE models in 
MAG‟s works is considered an alternative approach because MAG members, as a 
complement to the estimates from the standard policy models, investigated how alternative 
modeling techniques represented by DSGE models and reduced-form estimation could be 
applied to the issues under consideration.   
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 Idem, p 48. 
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IV. The model 
4.1. Households 
 
 The households consists of a continuum of  agents that are facing a intertemporal 
utility maximization process choosing consumption  and leisure . As is often 
the case in RBC literature, I used a logarithmic Bernoulli utility function for consumption 
and for leisure.  I also imposed a target in deposits  over their long run optimal level 
(steady state) through a quadratic disutility term. The household maximization program is: 
 
under the budget constraint: 
  
where  is the price level, is the real rate for deposits ,  is the real wage,   is the 
profit of the  -th intermediate production firm,   is the profit of the -th final good 
production firm.  and  represents the nominal 
profits redistributes by the merchant bank and the deposit bank to the households-
shareholders. 
4.2.1. Intermediate production firms 
 
Intermediate production firms represent a continuum of  agents that produce 
intermediate goods using capital  and labor  as inputs and  as total factor 
productivity. As in de Walque et al. (2010), the firms are facing costs for defaulting but are not 
excluded from the market. Costs are both pecuniary (higher search costs for obtaining new 
loans represented by the parameter ) and also non pecuniary (disutility or „social stigma‟ 
13 
 
represented by the parameter ). The -th intermediate production firm maximization 
program is represented by: 
 
under the constraints: 
 
 
The first constraint represents the law of motion for capital . Capital depreciates 
at a rate  and firms borrow from Merchant bank  at a price  to refill their capital 
stock. The interest rate is predetermined meaning it is fixed at the borrowing time  and not 
at the repayment time . This assumption is based on the fact that, when borrow, firms 
know their interest rate at the date they sign the contract with bank. Moreover, without this 
predetermination, the endogenous default choice would be irrelevant because it would be 
totally offset by an increase in interest rate. In reality, firms may also finance investments 
with own funds but this is beyond the scope of this paper so I assume that intermediate 
production firms finance investments only through credit. 
 The second constraint defines profit of the intermediate production firm . Firms 
pay a wage  to their workers and choose what proportion of their previous period credit 
 to reimburse, knowing that they will have to pay in the future a quadratic search cost 
on any defaulted amount. They sell the intermediate productions  to the final production 
firms at price  and they pay their costs at final price .  
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 4.2.2 Final production firm (the retailer) and market  
 
The final production firms also represent a continuum of  continuum agents that use 
the intermediate production to create final goods. They are monopolistically competitive 
firms with staggered price setting of the Calvo type with perfect indexation as in Christiano 
et al. (2005). The final goods producer  maximizes profit , choosing price  and 
demand for intermediate goods: 
 
under the constraints: 
 
  
The production function is linear, simply transforming intermediate production to final 
goods, , meaning that the retailers are just “branders” as in Gerali et al. (2008). 
The retailers are buying the intermediate goods from firms at price  and differentiate it at 
no cost. Each retailer then sells his final product, applying a markup over the intermediate 
price and taking into account the demand that it faces characterized by constant price 
elasticity  among types of goods. 
 In each period, a firm faces a constant probability  of being able to reoptimize 
its nominal price: 
 
The ability to reoptimize its price is independent across retailers and time. If a firm can 
reoptimize its price, it does so before the realization of the time  growth rate of money. 
Retailers that cannot reoptimize their price simply index to lagged inflation: 
15 
 
 
Let   denote the value of   set by retailer that can reoptimize the price at time . I 
preferred this notation that does not depend on  based on the fact that all firms that can 
reoptimize their price choose the same price, as other studies revealed12. 
 
 The market consists in a continuum of fully competitive distributors. These 
distributors have the role to aggregate demand by minimizing total costs: 
 
under the constraint: 
 
The demand function for final goods  is derived from this optimization problem. 
 4.3 The financial system 
 
The financial system resembles the setting proposed by de Walque et al. (2010): it is 
composed by a bank that borrows from interbank market and lends the intermediate 
production firms, a bank that receives deposits from households and lends the interbank 
market, a central bank that sets the interest rate on interbank market and conducts liquidity 
operations, and a supervisory authority that fixes the capital and liquidity requirement13.   
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 Christiano et al. (2005), p. 11 
13
 In Romania, the central bank conducts the monetary policy and also has the role of supervisory authority, but, 
to make it clear, I preferred to disaggregate these two roles. 
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 4.3.1 Bank borrowing from the interbank market (merchant bank) 
 
The representative risk-averse merchant bank choose fund allocation from amongst 
aggregated loans to intermediate goods firms , market book , borrowing  from 
interbank market and own funds , as well as the repayment rate on the past borrowing so 
as to maximize the sum of all expected payoffs. The payoff is represented by a concave 
function of profits, a disutility from default and a utility from the difference between own 
funds and particular required funds. The particular required funds can be different from the 
rate of required funds set by the supervisory authority (targeted rate)14. As for firms, the 
defaulters are not excluded but instead are imposed both pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs, 
where  represents the non-pecuniary cost and  represents the pecuniary cost. The 
merchant bank maximization program is: 
 
under the constraints: 
 
 
with ,  and  . First constraint states that at every period, banks devote an 
exogenous fraction  of nominal profits to own funds. Furthermore, a small fixed proportion 
 from the own funds are put in an insurance fund managed by a public authority. The 
insurance mechanism is very important in calculating the endogenous repayment rates 
because this allows banks to recover a fraction  of the firm‟s defaulted amount. The second 
constraint defines the bank‟s period real profit. The bank borrows  on the interbank 
market at a price  . It chooses a fraction   of past borrowing it wants to pay back, 
knowing that next period it will face a quadratic search cost on the defaulted amount. Banks 
                                                                 
14
 This is further detailed in section dedicated to supervisory authority. 
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also invest  in securities (market book) represented by government bonds  and 
common shares , where  is the share of government bonds. The expected return 
of the market book is a stochastic AR(1) process: 
 
where  is the equilibrium return,  is the persistence and  is a normally distributed 
shock. The supervisory authority fixes  and  the respective weights on loans and on the 
market book. In addition,  vary over time as I further illustrate in the supervisory authority 
section.   
 4.3.2 Bank lending to the interbank market (deposit bank) 
 
The representative risk–averse deposit bank choose fund allocation from amongst 
loans to the interbank market , market book , aggregated deposits from households  
and own funds  from profit maximization. As the merchant banks, they derive the utility  
 from the buffer of own funds above the targeted capital requirement.  
 
under the constraints: 
 
 
with ,  and   as well as in the case of the merchant bank. The first constraint is 
the law motion of own funds that are increased each period by a share  of nominal profits 
that are not redistributed to households. Furthermore, a small fixed proportion  from the 
own funds are put in an insurance fund managed by a public authority. The second constraint 
represents the bank‟s real profit . Deposit bank finance form households‟ aggregated 
18 
 
deposits at a price  and credit the interbank market with a price . A fraction  of the 
defaulted amount (by the defaulting merchant banks) is paid back to the deposit bank from 
the insurance fund managed by public authority. Because the deposits are guaranteed by a 
government fund, I assume that deposit banks never default and the households‟ deposits are 
fully paid. The deposit banks also have a market book investment with payoff 
 with the same return as merchant banks, . For simplicity, I assumed that 
.  
 4.4 Central bank 
 
 The central bank, as in Roger and Vlček (2011), sets the interbank rate according to a 
common Taylor type rule of the form: 
 
with parameters  and  representing the persistance and the aggresiveness of monetary 
policy so that , and .   represents the steady state value for interbank rate and 
 is the inflation.  
 The interbank equilibrium is set via liquidity injections. The liquidity injections are 
driven through a simplified McCallum rule that is complementary with the Taylor rule: 
 
, because when the interbank rate is set higher than its equilibrium value, the central bank 
injects the needed liquidity and when the interbank rate is set lower than its equilibrium 
value, the central bank absorbs the excess liquidity from interbank market. Parameter  helps 
the connection between denominated liquidity injections and interest rate expressed in 
percentage points.  
 
19 
 
 4.5 Supervisory authority 
 
 The supervisory authority sets the capital and the liquidity requirements and the 
weights associated with risk categories of assets. As I said before when I discussed about 
banks‟ utility of the buffer of own funds above the achieved capital requirement, banks can 
consider a different level of capitalization that maximize their utility. In Romania, the level 
of capitalization is sensitive higher than required ratio so I assumed the achieved level of 
capital that generates utility for banks follows the adjusting equation:     
 
where  is the persistency,  is the targeted ratio imposed by Basel III and  represents 
the capital requirement stochastic shock.  
 As in Macroeconomic Assessment Group work, an increase in the liquidity 
requirement is modeled as an increase in holding of government bonds. The liquidity 
requirement follows the same type of process like the targeted capital requirement: 
 
where  is the persistency,  is the steady state value for government bonds in market 
book and  represents the liquidity requirement stochastic shock. 
 The supervisory authority also sets the weights associated with risk categories of 
assets. For simplicity, I assume the weight of market book is fixed and is the same for 
merchant and deposit banks. Because of the endogenous default rates, I choose dynamic 
weights for loans to firms and for interbank credit meaning that the weights adjust when the 
expected future associated default rate changes.   
 The weight for loans to firms  depends on the evolution of firms‟ repayment rate 
and the weight for interbank loans  depends on the evolution of merchant banks‟ 
repayment rate: 
 
20 
 
 
with . 
V. Calibration 
 
The model is calibrated on average historical data from 2007Q1 to 2011Q4.15 I 
calibrate the banking sector using aggregate balance sheet of the monetary financial 
institutions and also I used the real interest rates for loans, deposits and interbank 
transactions. The calibration of the real sector is made using seasonal adjusted macro-
financial data from national account.  
  5.1 The real sector 
The production function is a Cobb-Douglas 
function with , and the productivity shock  is normalized to 1. I assumed that the 
capital stock is 10 times higher than the production, , and the depreciation rate of 
capital is . The ratio of the credit loss is about 5% so I choose a repayment rate of 
95%. As in de Walque et al. (2010), I assume that default cost for intermediate production 
firms represents on average 0.6% of intermediate output. The consumption is set to 81% of 
intermediate output to match the data.  
The probability of price reoptimization is 25% ( ) meaning that final good 
producing firms choose to change their price once a year. Also, the markup over the 
intermediate production price is set at 5% above it. 
5.2 The banking sector 
 The banking sector is calibrated to match the implied ratios of the aggregated balance 
sheet. The steady state values for the quarterly interest rates are set at 2.8% for borrowing 
interest rate, 1.6% for interbank interest rate and 1.4% for deposit interest rate. These values 
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 The data used are described in Appendix 1. 
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are close to the quarterly 2007 – 2011 data (2.45%, 1.32%, and 1.26%). The deposit interest 
rate of 1.4% implies a discount factor of . I assume that the quarterly return 
on market book is . This return is significantly higher than the return of the 
government bonds (approx. 1% quarterly) but we can expect that banks also have higher-
yield securities.  
 The aggregate balance sheet of the Romanian monetary institution is displayed in 
Appendix A. A key element of the calibration is the fact that some variables are stock in data 
and flow in model: households‟ deposits and production firms‟ loans. Because the lack of 
data, I assumed that the volume of loans and the volume of deposits are smaller than the 
observed data. In other words, imposed  and . 
Finally, I also imposed a market book for each bank equal to 50%:  and a 
50% share of government bonds in total market book ( )16. 
 According to the current Basel agreement, the minimum own funds requirement is set 
to 8% of risk-adjusted assets. I assumed as de Walque et al. that the loans to firms weight is 
 and the market book weight is  (weights ranging from 0 to 150%). For 
the interbank weight I assumed a lower value of  because of the central bank 
liquidity interventions that lower risk.  
 The allocation of profits is the same for both banks: 50% of their profits go to 
households ( ). To maintain the own funds stationary, I assumed that banks 
pay about 6% to the insurance fund (  and ) in exchange for 80% of the 
defaulted amount ( ). 
 From all these implied values for ratios and parameters I was able to infer the values 
for the default cost parameter for intermediate production firms  and the correspondent 
disutility parameter , the default cost parameter for merchant banks  and the 
correspondent disutility parameter . I also was able to infer the values for the utility 
parameters of own funds buffer  and .17 
                                                                 
16
 This is probably a high share but it helps illustrating better the reaction to liquidity requirement  
17
 The implied ratios and the parameters used can be found in Appendix B 
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VI. Simulations 
 
The simulations conducted have the purpose to check if the model is able to 
reproduce some well-known results of the economic theory. Using DYNARE v4 with 
MATLAB R2010A, I simulate business cycle moments, nominal frictions of intermediate 
goods price and final goods price, market book return volatility and, the most important, 
changes in financial stability related requirements.  
Simulations of business cycle are driven by an autoregressive total factor of 
productivity shock  with persistency ,  and 
. This approach is standard in RBC literature. 
 The market book return volatility is simulated through a autoregressive shock 
 with autoregressive parameter  and normally 
distributed innovations  , .  
 Nominal frictions are simulated through two distinct processes. First I assume that the 
first order condition obtained from the maximization program of the final good producers 
representing a partially forward-looking Phillips curve: 
 
is driven by normally distributed innovations , with . I choose this 
value for   because it generates an approximately 1% change in final prices. The second 
process is a intermediate production price shock.  is a simple normally distributed shock 
 with mean  and variance . It is unnecessary that these two 
shocks to be correlated simply because  is integrated in the process of .     
 Simulations of changes in financial stability related requirements are driven by two 
distinct uncorrelated processes of capital requirement and liquidity requirement. These 
simulations are almost similar with Roger and Vlček (2011) framework.  The capital 
requirement process has two different shock components: a deterministic shock in the 
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targeted component, meaning that the future values of this variable are known according to 
Basel III18, and a stochastic shock that influence the achieved capitalization level. The 
stochastic shock  is normally distributed,   with . This 
variance can be interpreted as a variance of achieved capitalization level generated by bank‟s 
own decisions.  
Regarding liquidity requirements, I used the same technique as Roger and Vlček: I 
assumed that government bonds level is shocked with normally distributed innovations  
 having .  Multiplying the shock with the value of government 
bonds, I actually obtained a 25% increase of the government bonds, the same as in the 
scenario used by Macroeconomic Assessment Group.    
 The results of the simulations are found in the Appendix C in the form of the impulse 
response functions. The impulse response functions are plotted only for the stochastic shocks 
of the capital and liquidity requirements because the other shock only were used to provide 
the consistency for the framework.19 To emphasis on relevance of the deterministic shock of 
the capital requirement, I also included a 10 year forecast where both stochastic and 
deterministic disturbances can be observed.   
As a general result, the reactions of the macroeconomic and financial variables are in 
respect with economic sense. More than that, from the impulse response functions, we can 
observe that capital requirement stochastic shock has little negative effect on gross domestic 
product and also a negative impact on the interbank market. The liquidity requirement has a 
negative impact on own funds and a negative impact followed in next quarter by a positive 
one on gross domestic product. 
VII. Estimation 
I have extended further the research of this field than de Walque et al. (2010) or 
Roger and Vlček (2011) by estimating several parameters that I consider important for this 
framework. I estimated the following parameters: 
                                                                 
18
 Basel III Agreement proposes an increase of the capital requirements from 8% to 10.25% 
19
 These results are also important but I choose not to distract the reader‟s attention form the main objectives of 
this paper. 
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 disutility or „social stigma‟ of default for intermediate production firms ; 
 disutility or „social stigma‟ of default for merchant banks ; 
 the search costs parameter for obtaining new loans by intermediate 
production firms ; 
 the pecuniary cost parameter for obtaining new interbank loans by merchant 
bank ; 
 the utility parameters of own funds buffer for merchant bank ; 
 the utility parameters of own funds buffer for deposit bank ; 
 the persistency of the targeted capital requirement ;   
7.1 Data 
 
I used only three data series to match the observed variables: nominal gross domestic 
product, nominal capital and reserves of financial institutions and nominal interbank 
deposits. The small number of series can be explained by the fact that the model contains 
only six shocks and are estimated only seven parameters, others being calibrated. The series 
have quarterly frequency and range from 2000Q1 to 2011Q4 meaning that there are 48 
observations for every series. All the data are expressed in national currency and where 
denominated by .  
The GDP series was downloaded from EUROSTAT database and was already 
seasonal adjusted. The source of the own funds series (capital plus reserves) is the NBR 
database and the series was transformed from monthly frequency to quarterly frequency by 
choosing the observation at the end of every quarter. The interbank deposits series has the 
same source as own funds, the NBR database, and also was transformed from monthly 
frequency to quarterly frequency by choosing the average of the monthly observations of a 
quarter. 
7.2 Prior distributions 
For parameters that are defined on  range I choose a Beta distribution and for 
parameters that are defined on  I choose an Inverse Gamma distribution: 
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  is Inverse Gamma distributed with mean 0.12 and variance 0.01; 
  is Inverse Gamma distributed with mean 5.59 and variance 0.05; 
  is Inverse Gamma distributed with mean 72 and variance 0.1; 
  is Inverse Gamma distributed with mean 406 and variance 0.05; 
  is Inverse Gamma distributed with mean 4.83 and variance 0.05; 
  is Inverse Gamma distributed with mean 5.66 and variance 0.05; 
  is Beta distributed with mean 0.97, 0.01, 0.1; 
7.3 Estimation procedure  
As estimation procedure I used the Bayesian technique of estimation.  Griffoli (2010) 
argues that Bayesian estimation fits the complete, solved model, opposed to GMM estimation 
which is based on equilibrium relationships. Another advantage of the Bayesian techniques is 
the consideration of priors which work as weights in estimation process so that posterior 
distribution avoids peaking at false points where likelihood peaks.  
As in Griffoli‟s DYNARE User Guide (2010), Bayesian estimation routine is 
described as follows:  
- First, priors are described by a probability density function of the form  
where  stands for model and  represents the parameter of the model.  
- Second, the likelihood function describes the density of the observed data, given 
the model and its parameters:  where  are the  
observations.  The likelihood function is evaluated with the Kalman filter. 
- The posterior density is given by: 
 
where  is the marginal density of the data conditional on the model. 
- The posterior kernel that corresponds to the numerator of the posterior density:  
 
is simulated using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
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The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm implements the following four steps: First, it 
chooses a starting point , where this is typically the posterior mode. Second, it draws a 
 from a jumping distribution , where  is the 
inverse of the Hessian computed at the posterior mode. Third, it computes the acceptance 
ratio: . Finally it accepts or discards the  according 
to the following rule: .  The steps (2), (3) and (4) are 
repeated in a loop. 
For posterior distributions‟ simulation I used for Metropolis-Hastings chains with 
100,000 draws each and tuned the scale parameter to 0.9 so as to obtain an acceptance ratio 
of 0.27. 
7.4 Results 
 The results of the estimation are summarized in the table below20: 
Table 2: Estimation results 
Par
ameter 
Prior 
mean 
Posterior 
mean 
Confidence interval 
(90%) 
Prior PDF Prior 
standard 
deviation 
 0.05 0.1362 0.1180 0.1559 Inverse Gamma 0.01 
 3.6 3.9996 3.6508 4.3292 Inverse Gamma 0.05 
 79 97.4546 86.0744 103.2842 Inverse Gamma 0.1 
 506 689.8866 655.4378 723.4556 Inverse Gamma 0.05 
 4.83 4.3827 4.0758 4.7015 Inverse Gamma 0.05 
 5.66 5.0892 4.8734 5.2860 Inverse Gamma 0.05 
 0.5 0.5016 0.4847 0.5183 Beta 0.01 
 
Estimation of the deep parameters using Bayesian techniques showed that the 
disutility of firms default is higher than the calibrated value. The search costs parameter for 
                                                                 
20
 The impulse response functions can be found in Appendix D. 
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obtaining new loans by intermediate production firms  and the pecuniary cost parameter for 
obtaining new interbank loans by merchant bank  also have larger estimated values than 
calibration. Another parameter that I estimate is the persistency of the capital requirement 
and the result was a high persistency of 50.16%.  
The impulse response functions for the output are all significantly. The estimated 
impact of a capital requirement shock illustrated a decrease in gross domestic product of near 
0.01% and a decrease in the nominal own funds of 0.43%. The estimated impact of the 
liquidity requirement on output is a decrease with more than 2% but this is higher than the 
anticipated answer because of the high share of government bonds held in banks portfolio 
that I assumed. These responses are in line with the results obtained by MAG.  
VIII Conclusions  
 
In this dissertation paper, I propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
with a heterogeneous banking sector, endogenous default rates and nominal frictions that 
emphasize the role of supervisory authority in the pursuit of financial stability. I tried to 
develop a more comprehensive framework than the models that I used as basis by adding 
several new features described above in detail. I did this because I agree with the point of 
view of de Walque et al. (2010) arguing that a consistent framework for financial stability 
analysis must account for all linkages and diffusion processes, not only between financial and 
non-financial sectors, but also within the financial sector itself.   
The characteristics of this model regarding capital and liquidity requirements were 
modeled to resemble with those proposed by Macroeconomic Assessment Group so I was 
able to compare results with those obtained by other researchers. This model showed that, 
with a representation of a true interbank market, the interbank flows are affected when the 
capital and liquidity requirements are changing, in another words, it illustrates the fact that 
banks, as parts of a financial system, will concentrate more on their balance sheets and less 
on interconnection of the system. 
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As direct costs, the new requirements will have small negative impact on output, a 
result that could be anticipated mainly because of high degree of capitalization. Regarding 
the true level of liquidity in the system, I cannot make any further remark, except the fact that 
a reallocation of funds to market book despite loans produces a small negative impact 
because of the small share of market book in aggregated balance sheet. 
This framework obviously has many limitations. First of all, as in the papers already 
mentioned, I modeled a closed economy. In Romania, foreign equity and also external assets 
and liabilities play an important role that is uncovered by this model. The second important 
direction in which the model can be developed is introducing a non-bank financial sector 
because, nowadays, when banking credit is constrained, alternative credit channel 
represented by non-bank financial entities had grown to a significant level. The third 
important area in which the model is lacking is the undifferentiated households that do not 
include a very specific credit product: loans for consumption. Even with the same model 
structure, this study can be improved by including more observable data series and by 
gathering data that reflects the flows of aggregated balance sheet elements.  
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Appendix  
 
A. Data  
In calibration process I used the following data series from 2007Q1 – 2011Q4: 
- Credit to firms: monthly frequency, source: aggregated financial balance sheet, 
NBR; 
- Total deposits: monthly frequency, source: aggregated financial balance sheet, 
NBR; 
- Interbank deposits: monthly frequency, daily average, source: interbank 
statistics, NBR; 
- Market book: sum of securities (other than shares) held, shares / units, money 
market funds held by the credit and shares and other equity held,  monthly 
frequency, source: aggregated financial balance sheet, NBR; 
- Own funds: defined as capital plus reserves, monthly frequency, source: 
aggregated financial balance sheet, NBR; 
- Lending rate (real): deflated by CPI, quarterly compounded,  monthly 
frequency, source: monetary and financial indexes, NBR; 
- Interbank rate (real): average of ROBOR3M and ROBID3M, deflated by CPI, 
quarterly compounded,  monthly frequency, source: interbank statistics , NBR; 
- Borrowing rate (real): deflated by CPI, quarterly compounded,  monthly 
frequency, source: monetary and financial indexes, NBR; 
- Default rate for firms (bad loans): monthly frequency, source: credit risk 
statistics, NBR; 
- Consumption: seasonal adjusted, quarterly frequency, source: EUROSTAT; 
- Gross Domestic Product: seasonal adjusted, quarterly frequency, source: 
EUROSTAT; 
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In estimation process I used the following data series from 2000Q1 – 2011Q4 (48 
observations): 
- Gross Domestic Product: seasonal adjusted, quarterly frequency, source: 
EUROSTAT; 
- Own funds: defined as capital plus reserves, quarterly frequency, source: 
aggregated financial balance sheet, NBR; 
- Interbank deposits: monthly frequency, daily average, source: interbank 
statistics, NBR; 
 
Figure 1: The aggregated balance sheet for Romanian banking sector, average 2007-
2011 
 
 
 
1% 
46% 
35% 
9% 0% 
0% 
3% 
6% 
Assets 
Cash and other valuables
Loans granted and commitments assumed
by credit institutions, private property
Other loans
Securities (other than shares) held
Shares / units, money market funds held by
the credit institution.
Shares and other equity held by the credit
Fixed assets
72% 
0% 
1% 
17% 
10% 
Liabilities 
Deposits
Debt securities (other than shares) issued
by credit institutions
Shares / units issued by money market
funds
Capital and reserves
32 
 
 
B. The implied ratios, steady state variables and calibrated parameters 
Table 3: Implied ratios Table 4: Steady state 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Calibrated parameters 
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C. Impulse response functions 
 
Figure 2: Capital requirement shock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: Liquidity requirement shock 
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Figure 4: Forecast 
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D. Estimation results  
 
Figure 4: Prior and posterior distributions 
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Figure 5: Bayesian IRF 
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